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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This case involves a putative conflict between an opt-
out Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) damages class action based on 
state statutory wage and overtime laws that parallel the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and a separately 
filed opt-in collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the 
FLSA.  Both suits allege violations arising from the same 
conduct or occurrence by the same defendant.  At issue is 
whether federal jurisdiction over the Rule 23 class action 
based solely on diversity under the Class Action Fairness Act 
(CAFA), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), is inherently incompatible with 
jurisdiction over the FLSA action, and whether the FLSA 
preempts state laws that parallel its protections. 
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I. 
 Plaintiff James Fisher and former plaintiff Robert 
Vasvari1
 In July 2009, Fisher initiated a Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) 
class action lawsuit in the District of Maryland on behalf of 
all Maryland Rite Aid assistant managers, seeking damages 
for alleged misclassification as overtime-exempt under the 
Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law and Maryland, 
Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-501 to -509, and the 
Maryland Wage and Hour Law (MWHL), Md. Code Ann. 
Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-401 to -428.
 were assistant store managers at Rite Aid stores in 
Maryland and Ohio respectively.  In June 2009, both joined a 
nationwide opt-in action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the 
FLSA in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  Craig v. Rite 
Aid Corp., et al., No. 4:08-cv-02317-JEJ (M.D. Pa.).  The suit 
sought back pay for alleged misclassification of assistant 
managers as overtime-exempt under § 207 of the FLSA. 
2
                                              
1 Mr. Vasari died and was replaced by plaintiff Daniel 
Knepper,  Order Substituting Party, Vasvari v. Rite Aid Corp., 
No. 1:09-CV-02069 (JEJ) (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2010), but all 
claims and allegations remained unchanged. 
  The District of Maryland 
dismissed the Payment and Collection claims with prejudice, 
2 The MWHL parallels the overtime requirements set forth in 
the FLSA, requiring the payment of overtime for work over 
forty hours a week unless the employee falls within certain 
exemptions, including if the employee “is exempt from the 
overtime provisions of the federal [Fair Labor Standards] 
Act.”  Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 3-420. 
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ruling the statute does not govern claims to overtime pay, but 
dismissed the claim under the Wage and Hour law without 
prejudice under the “first-filed” rule, deferring to the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania.  Fisher v. Rite Aid Corp., No. RDB-
09-1909, 2010 WL 2332101 (D. Md. June 8, 2010).  Fisher 
then refiled his class action in the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, asserting jurisdiction based solely on diversity 
of citizenship under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
Also in July 2009, Vasvari initiated a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class action in the District of Northern Ohio seeking damages 
for alleged misclassification as overtime-exempt under the 
Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act (OMFWSA), 
O.R.C. §§ 4111.01-4111.17.3
 On February 16, 2011, the District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania, noting that “each action 
shares the same determinative issue,” published nearly 
  Jurisdiction was based solely 
on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).  The 
case was transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
based on the forum selection clause in Vasvari’s employment 
contract.  Stipulated Order Concerning Transfer to the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, Vasvari v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 4:09-
cv-1699 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 2009). 
                                              
3 The Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act also parallels 
the overtime requirements of the FLSA, requiring overtime 
pay for work over forty hours a week “subject to the 
exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the ‘Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938,’ [§§] 207, 213, as amended.”  O.R.C. 
§ 4111.03(a) (citation omitted). 
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identical opinions in both cases granting defendants’ motion 
to dismiss on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).   
Fisher v. Rite Aid Corp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 n.2 (M.D. 
Pa. 2011); Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 707, 
710 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 2011).  It found that the Ohio state law 
provisions at issue were not preempted because the FLSA 
includes a “savings clause” establishing Congress’s intent not 
to preempt state law.4
                                              
4 The District Court did not discuss preemption of the 
Maryland employment law in Fisher, but its logic would 
encompass that action as well. 
  Knepper, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 712.  But 
it ruled the Rule 23 opt-out class actions based on state 
employment laws paralleling the FLSA were “inherently 
incompatible” with the opt-in procedure provided by the 
FLSA, which was “specifically designed to prevent litigation 
through representative action” and “expresses Congress’s 
intent to . . . eliminat[e] representative (i.e., opt-out) actions.”  
Id. at 714 (internal quotation marks omitted); Fisher, 764 F. 
Supp. 2d at 706 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It 
reached this conclusion even though the Rule 23 class actions 
were free-standing cases brought under CAFA diversity 
jurisdiction rather than “combined” actions invoking 
supplemental jurisdiction, reasoning that “denying a plaintiff 
the opportunity to litigate a claim in one action, but allowing 
the claim to proceed in an action that only differs from the 
original by docket number, does not vindicate the purposes 
behind application of the doctrine in the first place.”  Fisher, 
764 F. Supp. 2d at 706; Knepper, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 713.  
Based on this ruling that inherent incompatibility barred the 
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suit, the District Court declined to address the further 
objection that Rule 23 certification would implicate the Rules 
Enabling Act.  Fisher, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 704; Knepper, 764 
F. Supp. 2d at 714. 
 Plaintiffs appealed.  Both actions share the same legal 
issue and present no meaningful factual differences.  We 
discuss them together.5
II. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides a private right of action to 
recover for violations of the FLSA, including a suit by “one 
or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves 
and other employees similarly situated.”  In 1947, Congress 
amended this provision to require that a plaintiff in a FLSA 
suit “give[] his consent in writing to become such a party and 
such consent is filed in the court in which such action is 
brought.”  Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Ch. 52, § 5(a), 61 
Stat. 84, 87 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).  Because the 
purpose of this amendment and its implications for federal 
opt-out class actions based on state law are in dispute, we 
consider its history in detail. 
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938.  Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 201-219).  The law sought to protect workers, 
                                              
5 We exercise jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
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particularly non-unionized workers, by establishing federal 
minimum wage, maximum hour, and overtime guarantees that 
could not be avoided through contract.  Symczyk v. Genesis 
HealthCare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 n.18 
(1945)).  As originally enacted, the law provided for 
enforcement by the Secretary of Labor or through private 
actions that could be brought “in any court of competent 
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf 
of himself or themselves and other employees similarly 
situated, or such employee or employees may designate an 
agent or representative to maintain such action for and in 
behalf of all employees similarly situated.”  FLSA, § 16(b), 
52 Stat. at 1069. 
 From 1944 to 1947, the Supreme Court decided three 
cases determining that on-the-job travel time constituted 
“work” within the meaning of the FLSA and therefore 
contributed to the maximum working hours for the 
calculation of overtime.  Tenn. Coal, Iron, & R.R. Co. v. 
Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944); Jewell Ridge 
Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am., 
325 U.S. 161 (1945); Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 
328 U.S. 680 (1946).  While the first two cases were limited 
to underground mining, the third extended the concept of 
“portal-to-portal” pay to a large factory, determining that “the 
time necessarily spent by the employees in walking to work 
on the employer’s premises . . . was working time within the 
scope” of the FLSA.  Anderson, 328 U.S. at 691.   
 Workers responded to the Mt. Clemens decision by 
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initiating thousands of § 16(b) FLSA suits seeking back pay 
for “portal-to-portal” violations.6  Nearly all the suits filed 
under § 16(b) were brought by unions.7  These suits were 
“representative” in the sense that, as authorized by the statute, 
they were initiated by third-party union officials as 
representatives of the employees, the real parties in interest.  
But despite the broad language allowing suits on behalf of 
those “similarly situated,” these were not opt-out class actions 
analogous to suits under modern Rule 23, which did not exist 
at the time.8
                                              
6 By January 1947, 1,913 claims had been filed, with an 
aggregate amount sought approaching $6 billion.  S. Rep. No. 
80-48, at 2 (1947). 
  Instead, case law on § 16(b) held that plaintiffs 
7 See Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, and 
For Other Purposes: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 2 of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong. 166 (1947) 
(hereinafter Hearings)  (testimony of Lee Pressman, general 
counsel of the CIO) (stating he knew of no suits filed by 
unorganized workers); see also S. Rep. No. 80-48, at 12 
(“Evidence demonstrates conclusively the existence of a very 
close connection between many of the suits and certain CIO 
affiliates.”).  All thirteen pages of the Senate report on “the 
Portal-to-Portal Lawsuits” addressed allegations of extensive 
union involvement.  S. Rep. No. 80-48, at 12-25. 
8 The original version of Rule 23 provided three categories of 
class action: “true,” involving ‘joint, common, or secondary 
rights’”; “hybrid,” involving “‘several’ rights related to 
‘specific property’”; and “spurious,” involving “‘several’ 
rights affected by a common question and related to common 
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must affirmatively join in a representative action to recover, 
analogizing such suits to “spurious” class actions available 
under Rule 23(a)(3) at the time.9
                                                                                                     
relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, 
reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966).  Summarizing the 
earlier rule, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules stated, 
“[J]udgments in ‘true’ and ‘hybrid’ class actions would 
extend to the class (although in somewhat different ways); the 
judgment in a ‘spurious’ class action would extend only to the 
parties including intervenors.”  Id.  Because almost all 
modern class actions arise from a common question but 
seldom involve joint rights or a common property, under the 
pre-revision Rule 23 scheme they would be categorized as 
“spurious” class actions and therefore require affirmative 
joinder for recovery. 
  Those filing suits shared 
9 A comprehensive survey of the case law on the question of 
the classification of § 16(b) actions appears in Pentland v. 
Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 853-56 (3d Cir. 1945).  The court 
there concluded that these actions were “spurious class 
actions” requiring the joinder of plaintiffs, suggesting that it 
would be a “startling result to find that every fellow employee 
was bound by the estoppel of that judgment when he came to 
sue the employer.”  Id.; see also Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 
1062, 1070-71 (3d Cir. 1988) (observing that § 16(b) of the 
FLSA and the original Rule 23 of the Federal Rules were both 
enacted in 1938, and that, “[u]nder both the statute and the 
rule, class actions in which absent members were not bound 
by the judgment were recognized.”)  This conclusion was in 
accord with nearly all the scholarly commentary from the era.  
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this understanding.  See Hearings at 175 (statement of CIO 
counsel Lee Pressman) (testifying that in his view, “a suit 
under the wage-and-hour law, if you recover, the judgment 
runs only to the extent that there are individual plaintiffs—
that is, individual men who signed authorization cards”); see 
also Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of 
the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 39 Buff. L. Rev. 53, 172 
(1991).   But one court suggested that the FLSA might permit 
plaintiffs to join after judgment had been reached—a 
procedure that later became termed “one-way” intervention, 
where plaintiffs could sit out an action, choosing to opt in and 
be bound by the judgment only after a favorable outcome.10
 Congress responded to the Mt. Clemens decision and 
   
Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F.2d 851, 856 (3d Cir. 1945).     
                                                                                                     
See, e.g., Albert B. Gerber & S. Harry Galfand, Employees’ 
Suits Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
505, 508-09 (1947); Rufus G. Poole, Private Litigation under 
the Wage and Hour Act, 14 Miss. L. J. 157, 165 (1942); 
James A. Rahl, The Class Action Device and Employee Suits 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 37 Ill. L. Rev. 119, 122-
23 (1942). 
10 This procedure was abolished with the revision of Rule 23 
in 1966.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s note, 
39 F.R.D. at 105 (“Under proposed subdivision (c)(3), one-
way intervention is excluded”) (citing Pentland, 152 F.2d at 
856); see also Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 
545-47 (1974) (noting the “considerable criticism” of one-
way intervention, and the intent of the 1966 amendments to 
eliminate the practice). 
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the flood of lawsuits by enacting the Portal-to-Portal Act of 
1947, Ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84.  The law sought to staunch the 
proliferation of suits and remedy what Congress perceived to 
be “wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and 
retroactive in operation” by statutorily reversing judicial 
interpretations of the FLSA.  Id. § 1.  In an effort to address 
the threat of “excessive and needless litigation and 
champertous practices,” id., Section 5 of the law banned what 
it termed “representative actions.”   It amended § 16(b) to 
read:  
Action to recover such liability may be 
maintained in any court of competent 
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for 
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other 
employees similarly situated. No employee 
shall be a party plaintiff to any such action 
unless he gives his consent in writing to become 
such a party and such consent is filed in the 
court in which such action is brought. 
Id. § 5(a) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).  As the Supreme 
Court later characterized this modification, “In part 
responding to excessive litigation spawned by plaintiffs 
lacking a personal interest in the outcome, the representative 
action by plaintiffs not themselves possessing claims was 
abolished, and the requirement that an employee file a written 
consent was added.”  Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 
493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989). 
 The Sperling Court cited legislative history that further 
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illuminates the meaning of the provision.  Senator Donnell, 
chairman of the drafting subcommittee, offered an exposition 
of § 5(a) and its purported remedy of the deficiencies of § 
16(b) during Senate debates.  93 Cong. Rec. 2,182 (1947).   
He observed that § 16(b) had allowed two types of actions.  
“First, a suit by one or more employees, for himself and all 
other employees similarly situated.  That I shall call for the 
purpose of identification a collective action, a suit brought by 
one collectively for himself and others. . . . In [this] case an 
employee . . . can sue for himself and other employees.  We 
have no objection to that.”  Id.  What Senator Donnell 
objected to was the “second class of actions,” which he 
deemed “a representative action, as distinguished from a 
collective action.”  Id.  In these cases, “an agent or 
representative who may not be an employee of the company 
at all can be designated by the employee or employees to 
maintain an action on behalf of all employees similarly 
situated.”  Id.   He characterized this class of cases as those 
“in which an outsider, perhaps someone who is desirous of 
stirring up litigation without being an employee at all, is 
permitted to be the plaintiff in the case.”  Id.  Senator Donnell 
went on to explain the purpose of the requirement that each 
employee give his consent in writing to become a plaintiff.  
This, he argued, was a 
wholesome provision, for it is certainly 
unwholesome to allow an individual to come 
into court alleging that he is suing on behalf of 
10,000 persons and actually not have a solitary 
person behind him, and then later on have 
10,000 men join in the suit, which was not 
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brought in good faith, was not brought by a 
party in interest, and was not brought with the 
actual consent or agency of the individuals for 
whom an ostensible plaintiff filed the suit. 
Id. 11
These statements, taken together with the historical 
context, elucidate the congressional purpose behind § 216(b).  
First, the primary concern of Congress was “representative” 
actions as Senator Donnell defined them, and of the sort that 
had dominated the portal-to-portal litigation—that is, 
instances where union leaders allegedly “stirred up” litigation 
without a personal stake in the case.  As a contemporary 
commentator stated, “The banning of representative actions 
for unpaid wages is an obvious device to prevent the 
maintenance of employee suits by labor unions.”  Note, Fair 
Labor Standards Under the Portal to Portal Act, 15 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 352, 360 (1948).   
    
Second, Congress intended the requirement of written 
consent to bar plaintiffs from joining a collective action well 
after it had begun, particularly when the original statute of 
                                              
11 Sen. Donnell also stressed that the revised § 5(a) would 
prevent plaintiffs opting in after the original statute of 
limitations had run.  The Senate Report reiterated this view, 
stating that the new language ensured that “the 
commencement of the collective action does not stop the 
running of the statute of limitations for those who later 
become parties to the action.”  S. Rep. No. 80-48, at 49.   
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limitations had run and when those opting in would not be 
bound by an adverse decision.  These requirements abrogated 
the Pentland decision and foreclosed the possibility of one-
way intervention in FLSA actions.  See Fair Labor Standards 
Under the Portal to Portal Act, supra, at 360 & n.60. 
 In sum, the enforcement scheme in the Portal-to-Portal 
Act largely codified the existing rules governing spurious 
class actions, with special provisions intended to redress the 
problem of representative actions brought by unions under 
earlier provisions of the FLSA and the problem of “one-way” 
intervention.  Absent from the debates was any mention of 
opt-out class actions—an unsurprising fact, since the FLSA 
had not been interpreted to permit such suits.  The FLSA did 
not become relevant to opt-out class actions until after the 
revision of Rule 23 and the creation of modern Rule 23(b)(3) 
in 1966.  During that process, the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules disclaimed any intention for the new opt-out rule 
to affect 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory 
committee’s note, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 104 (1966).  The 
effect of this grandfathering was to convert what had been an 
affirmative grant beyond the limited provisions of pre-
revision Rule 23 into “a limitation upon the affirmative 
permission for representative actions that already exists in 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  (That is to 
say, were it not for this provision of § 216(b) the 
representative action could be brought even without the prior 
consent of similarly situated employees.)”  Sperling, 493 U.S. 
at 176 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis removed). 
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III. 
  We exercise plenary review of a judgment under Rule 
12(c).  Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citing Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 
F.2d 289, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1998)).  We grant the motion only 
if, viewing all the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, no material issue of fact remains and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Id.  
Here, there are no disputed questions of fact, and we exercise 
de novo review over the District Court’s determinations on 
the legal questions of inherent incompatibility and 
preemption.  Roth v. Norfalco LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 374 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  
A. 
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides: 
An action to recover the liability prescribed in 
either of the preceding sentences [for failure to 
pay statutorily required overtime or wages 
under the FLSA] may be maintained against 
any employer (including a public agency) in 
any Federal or State court of competent 
jurisdiction by any one or more employees for 
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other 
employees similarly situated.  No employee 
shall be a party plaintiff to any such action 
unless he gives his consent in writing to become 
18 
 
such a party and such consent is filed in the 
court in which such action is brought. 
Courts have concluded that the plain language of this 
provision bars opt-out class actions to enforce the provisions 
of the FLSA under the well-established principle that, where 
Congress has provided a detailed remedy, other remedies are 
unavailable.  See, e.g., Kendall v. City of Chesapeake, Va., 
174 F.3d 437, 439-43 (4th Cir. 1999); Lusardi v. Lechner, 
855 F.2d 1062, 1068 n.8 (3d Cir. 1988); Lervill v. Inflight 
Motion Pictures, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1972).  
This limitation applies to other federal laws that incorporate 
the FLSA’s enforcement mechanism, primarily the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).  
LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
The concept of inherent incompatibility seeks to 
extend this logic to state employment-law claims.  It arose in 
the context of dual-filed FLSA opt-in and state law opt-out 
class actions where the federal court was asked to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that paralleled 
the claims under the FLSA.  Some district courts have 
reasoned that the contrast between an opt-in and opt-out 
procedure bars the federal courts from hearing such “hybrid” 
or “combined” actions.  See, e.g., Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & 
Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Otto v. Pocono 
Health Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524 (M.D. Pa. 2006); 
Moeck v. Gray Supply Corp., No. 03-1950, 2006 WL 42368 
19 
 
(D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2006).12
The concept of inherent incompatibility has not fared 
well at the appellate level.  Four courts of appeals have 
rejected its application to dual-filed FLSA and class actions.  
Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 
247-49 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e agree with the Seventh Circuit 
that . . . ‘the ‘conflict’ between the opt-in procedure under the 
FLSA and the opt-out procedure under Rule 23 is not a proper 
reason to decline jurisdiction.’”); Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., 
Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 976-79 (7th Cir. 2011) (“There is ample 
evidence that a combined action is consistent with the regime 
Congress has established in the FLSA.”); Wang v. Chinese 
Daily News, 623 F.3d 743, 760-61 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated on 
other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 74 (2011)  (“We follow Lindsay in 
concluding that it was within the district court’s discretion to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the [state law] claim 
in this case.”); Lindsay v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 416, 
424 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“While there is unquestionably a 
difference . . . between opt-in and opt-out procedures, we 
doubt that a mere procedural difference can curtail section 
1367’s jurisdictional sweep.”).   
  In this case, the District Court 
applied this reasoning to an independent class action based on 
state law claims brought under federal diversity jurisdiction. 
                                              
12 The one case cited by the District Court from outside the 
Third Circuit—McClain v. Leona’s Pizzeria, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 
574 (N.D. Ill. 2004)—is no longer good law in light of the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ervin v. OS Rest. Servs., Inc., 
632 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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The most thorough examination of the issue appears in 
Ervin.13
                                              
13 Rite Aid seeks to distinguish Ervin on the grounds that it 
arose in the context of a denial of class certification, not a 
motion to dismiss, and that the Illinois state laws at issue 
provided greater protection than the FLSA.  But its 
procedural posture does not distinguish it from this case, 
since the denial of certification was based primarily on the 
concept of inherent incompatibility, which Ervin 
unambiguously rejects.  Ervin, 632 F.3d at 975; see id. at 973-
74 (“We conclude that there is no categorical rule against 
certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) state-law class action in a 
proceeding that also includes a collective action brought 
under the FLSA.”).  Moreover, the fact that the Illinois laws 
at issue provided greater protection would be relevant on the 
question of preemption, since they would then fall within the 
explicit scope of the FLSA’s savings clause.  But the concept 
of inherent incompatibility is distinct from the issue of 
preemption and hinges on the contrast between the opt-in and 
opt-out class procedure, which Ervin squarely addressed. 
  There, the Seventh Circuit rejected the lower court’s 
conclusion that the dual-filed action should be dismissed 
because of inherent incompatibility, suggesting that the 
district court had “jumped too quickly to congressional 
intent.”  Ervin, 632 F.3d at 977.  Examining the text of § 
216(b), the court found nothing that suggests that “the FLSA 
is not amenable to state-law claims for related relief in the 
same federal proceeding,” especially since the FLSA contains 
an express savings clause.  Id.  Nor did the congressional 
purpose contradict this conclusion, since the Portal-to-Portal 
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Act was “designed to eliminate lawsuits by third parties 
(typically union leaders) on behalf of a disinterested 
employee (in other words, someone who would not otherwise 
have participated in the federal lawsuit).”  Id. at 978.  An 
employee who does not opt in to the federal class would 
receive only the “relief that is prescribed under the law 
governing her part of the case,” which would simply 
represent the adjudication of state law claims implicit in the 
concept of supplemental jurisdiction.  Id.   
We agree that the plain text of § 216(b) provides no 
support for the concept of inherent incompatibility.  The 
provision specifically applies only to actions for violations of 
“the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title” for 
“unpaid minimum wages” or “unpaid overtime 
compensation,” as well as claims for injunctive relief for 
retaliation in violation of § 215(a)(3).  29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  
Moreover, while the law requires each plaintiff to opt in to a 
suit in writing, by its plain terms this requirement extends 
only to “any such action”—namely, suits brought under § 
216(b).  Neither § 216(b) nor any other FLSA provision 
addresses causes of action for relief under state employment 
law.  The references to state law in the FLSA manifest only 
congressional intent not to preempt state standards.  29 U.S.C. 
§§ 207(r)(4), 218(a), 218a, 218c(b)(2). 
 In the absence of a clear textual mandate, those courts 
endorsing the concept of inherent incompatibility have 
reasoned from congressional intent.  The District Court here 
stated:  
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It is clear that Congress labored to create an 
opt-in scheme when it created Section 216(b) 
specifically to alleviate the fear that absent 
individuals would not have their rights litigated 
without their input or knowledge.  To allow [a] 
Section 216(b) opt-in action to proceed 
accompanied by a Rule 23 opt-out state law 
class action claim would essentially nullify 
Congress’s intent in crafting Section 216(b) and 
eviscerate the purpose of Section 216(b)’s opt-
in requirement. 
Fisher, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 705 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Otto, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 524);  Knepper, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 
712.  A similar discussion appeared in Ellis, which involved a 
Rule 23 opt-out action based in part on the OMFWSA filed 
alongside an FLSA opt-in suit.  In determining that the two 
suits were inherently incompatible, the court examined the 
“[h]istory and policy” of FLSA opt-in actions and Rule 23 
opt-out actions in detail, stressing § 216(b)’s “two-fold 
purpose of ‘limiting private FLSA plaintiffs to employees 
who asserted claims in their own right and freeing employers 
of the burden of representative actions.’”  Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 
2d at 443-46 (quoting Sperling, 493 U.S. at 173).  In support, 
it cited Senator Donnell’s statement, discussed at length 
above, objecting to suits brought without “the actual consent 
or agency of the individuals for whom an ostensible plaintiff 
filed the suit.”  Id. (quoting 93 Cong. Rec. 2,182 (1947)) 
(emphasis removed). 
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 As an initial matter, we question the implementation of 
perceived congressional intent absent any clear textual or 
doctrinal basis.  “[T]he authoritative statement is the statutory 
text, not the legislative history . . . . Extrinsic materials have a 
role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a 
reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of 
otherwise ambiguous terms.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005); see also 
Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 569 (3d Cir. 
2002) (noting that, in the event of a “conflict between a 
statute’s plain meaning and its general policy objectives,” the 
conflict should “be resolved in favor of the statute’s plain 
meaning.”).  As discussed, we do not find § 216(b) 
ambiguous: it explicitly limits its scope to the provisions of 
the FLSA, and does not address state-law relief.  Because 
reliance on the remarks of legislators not to supplement, but 
to supplant the duly enacted statutory text “circumvent[s] the 
Article I process,”  Exxon Mobil, 545 U.S. at 570, we do not 
need to go beyond the plain text in interpreting § 216(b). 
But even if we regarded § 216(b) as ambiguous—if we 
entertained the possibility that the phrase “any such action” 
encompasses actions based on state-law claims that paralleled 
the protections provided by the FLSA14
                                              
14 This interpretation conflicts not only with the provision’s 
plain text, as discussed, but also with its legislative history.  
See Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 § 5(b), 61 Stat. at 87 (“The 
amendment made by subsection (a) of this section [requiring 
plaintiffs to opt in to FLSA collective actions in writing] shall 
—we are unconvinced 
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by Rite Aid’s view of the legislative purpose of the Portal-to-
Portal Act.  There was some concern that plaintiffs could be 
bound by a decision in a case where they had neither “input 
[n]or knowledge.”  But the full legislative record casts doubt 
on the contention that § 216(b) was intended to “eliminat[e] 
representative (i.e., opt-out) actions.”  Fisher, 764 F. Supp. 2d 
at 706; Knepper, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 711.  The historical 
evidence establishes that Congress created the opt-in scheme 
primarily as a check against the power of unions, whose 
representatives had allegedly manufactured litigation in 
which they had no personal stake, and as a bar against one-
way intervention by plaintiffs who would not be bound by an 
adverse judgment.  Neither purpose speaks to the propriety of 
an opt-out class action, especially since modern Rule 23 opt-
out actions did not exist at the time and had not occurred 
under the earlier FLSA enforcement scheme.15
                                                                                                     
be applicable only with respect to actions commenced under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . .”). 
  Accordingly, 
15 One reason for diverging interpretations is the conflation of 
two different meanings of the word “representative.”  As 
Senator Donnell’s statement makes clear, he understood a 
representative action to be one in which “an agent or 
representative who may not be an employee of the company 
at all can be designated by the employee or employees to 
maintain an action on behalf of all employees similarly 
situated.”  93 Cong. Rec. 2,182 (1947).  By contrast, although 
a modern Rule 23 class action is often described as a 
“representative action” with the named plaintiff as a “class 
representative,” the “representative” must be a member of the 
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we disagree that certifying an opt-out class based on state 
employment law contravenes the congressional purpose 
behind the Portal-to-Portal Act. 
Moreover, this approach to congressional intent 
assumes that the only relevant congressional purpose in this 
case is that expressed in enacting the Portal-to-Portal Act.  
But a countervailing congressional purpose can be found in 
the Class Action Fairness Act, which provides federal 
jurisdiction over state-law class actions that satisfy its 
requirements.  Rite Aid correctly notes that CAFA does not 
grant jurisdiction in all cases, providing judges discretionary 
jurisdiction in some instances, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3), and 
barring jurisdiction in others, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4).16
                                                                                                     
class, not a third party without an interest in the litigation.  In 
the context of an employment class action, the class 
representative must be an employee.  A modern Rule 23 class 
action is analogous to what Senator Donnell dubbed a 
“collective action,” where “an employee . . . can sue for 
himself and other employees,” to which Senator Donnell had 
“no objection.”  Id.  
  But 
the fact-specific requirements that must be satisfied before 
these subsections apply demonstrate that Congress did not 
intend courts to invoke an extratextual supplement outside 
those exceptions to decline otherwise available jurisdiction.  
See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
16 There is no suggestion by Rite Aid or the District Court 
that the requirements for CAFA jurisdiction were not 
satisfied, nor that any basis for denial of jurisdiction exists 
under § 1332(d)(3) or (4). 
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424 U.S. 800, 808 (1976) (“When there are statutes clearly 
defining the jurisdiction of the courts, the force and effect of 
such provisions should not be disturbed by a mere implication 
. . . .” (quoting Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.S. 257, 
262 (1897)).   
Rite Aid also argues our decision in De Asencio v. 
Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2003), supports the 
concept of inherent incompatibility.  In De Asencio, we 
determined that the trial court had abused its discretion by 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over an opt-out class 
action based on Pennsylvania wage law filed together with an 
opt-in class action under the FLSA.  Id. at 307-12.  We 
grounded our decision in the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c), particularly the provisions that the district court may 
decline jurisdiction over a state-law claim when it “raises a 
novel or complex issue of State law” or when it “substantially 
predominates” over the federal claim.  Id.  We concluded that 
the presence of two novel state-law issues, along with the 
inordinate size of the state-law class, did not satisfy this 
standard and led us to conclude that supplemental jurisdiction 
was unavailable because “the federal action is an appendage 
to the more comprehensive state action.”  Id. 
As this account suggests, De Asencio is 
distinguishable, as the Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have 
all concluded.  Ervin, 632 F.3d at 981 (“De Asencio 
represents only a fact-specific application of well-established 
rules, not a rigid rule about the use of supplemental 
jurisdiction in cases combining an FLSA count with a state-
law class action.”); Wang, 623 F.3d at 761; Lindsay, 448 F.3d 
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at 425 n.11.  Unlike the state law claims at issue in De 
Asencio, there is no suggestion that the claims under the 
MWHL and the OMFWSA are novel or complex; Rite Aid’s 
principal objection is that these state claims are too similar to 
federal claims with which the federal courts are well familiar.  
Nor does this case present an instance of supplemental 
jurisdiction, where there is statutory authority to decline 
jurisdiction in the factual circumstances of De Asencio.17  
Here, independent jurisdiction exists over plaintiffs’ claims 
under CAFA, which provides no statutory basis for declining 
jurisdiction in this instance.  For these reasons, we do not 
believe De Asencio supports dismissal.18
In sum, we disagree with the conclusion that 
jurisdiction over an opt-out class action based on state-law 
claims that parallel the FLSA is inherently incompatible with 
the FLSA’s opt-in procedure.  Nothing in the plain text of § 
216(b) addresses the procedure for state-law claims, nor, in 
 
                                              
17 We do not suggest there is an affirmative bar to 
supplemental jurisdiction over a dual-filed opt-in/opt-out 
action, only that such suits must still satisfy the specific 
statutory requirements of § 1367. 
18 At one point in De Asencio, we employed potentially 
misleading language to describe the legislative history of the 
Portal-to-Portal Act, suggesting that Congress “changed 
participation in an FLSA class from ‘opt-out’ to ‘opt-in.’”  De 
Asencio, 342 F.3d at 306.  Although this dictum played no 
role in our holding, which was grounded in the specific 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, we correct this 
misstatement now. 
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our view, does the provision’s legislative history establish a 
clear congressional intent to bar opt-out actions based on state 
law.  We join the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits 
in ruling that this purported “inherent incompatibility” does 
not defeat otherwise available federal jurisdiction. 
B. 
 We next consider whether the FLSA preempts the 
MWHL and the OMFWSA.  The District Court concluded 
that it does not.  Rite Aid disputes this conclusion and urges 
affirmance of the dismissal on this ground.   
 Under the Supremacy Clause, state law that “interferes 
with or is contrary to” federal law is preempted.  Kurns v. 
A.W. Chesterton Inc., 620 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).  State law 
may be preempted by express congressional language, “by 
implication from the depth and breadth of a congressional 
scheme that occupies the legislative field,” or “by implication 
because of a conflict with a congressional enactment.”  
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001).  
Two fundamental principles guide our preemption analysis.  
First, “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in 
every pre-emption case.”  Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 
(2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 
(1996)).  Second, when Congress has acted “in a field which 
the States have traditionally occupied,” we presume that “the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded 
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”  Id. 
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 The FLSA contains a savings clause, which states, “No 
provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall 
excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or 
municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher 
than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a 
maximum work week lower than the maximum workweek 
established under this chapter.”  29 U.S.C. § 218(a).  Because 
the overtime provisions of the MWHL and the OMFWSA 
establish the same, rather than higher, protections than the 
FLSA, they are not expressly preserved by this provision.  
Nevertheless, the savings clause is relevant to the question of 
preemption.  Express preemption is improper here, as the 
statute’s plain language evinces a clear intent to preserve 
rather than supplant state law.  Moreover, as the District 
Court noted, the presence of the savings clause undermines 
any suggestion that Congress intended to occupy the field of 
wage and hour regulation. 
 Rite Aid urges that the state laws here constitute an 
“obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress,” Gade v. Nat’l Solid 
Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992), and are 
impliedly preempted under the principles of conflict 
preemption.  But this proposition is counterintuitive, since it 
suggests that state enforcement of standards that are identical 
with those established in the FLSA would somehow conflict 
with congressional purpose.  This would be especially odd 
where Congress explicitly contemplated dual enforcement of 
the FLSA.  Moreover, a finding of preemption here would bar 
enforcement of all state wage and hour laws that did not 
exceed the standards of the FLSA, a significant intrusion on 
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state authority and a reversal of the traditional presumption 
against preemption, which is particularly strong given states’ 
lengthy history of regulating employees’ wages and hours.  
See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham 
Constr., 519 U.S. 316, 330 (1997) (presuming that ERISA did 
not preempt a state wage law in light of the state’s lengthy 
history of wage regulation); see also Daniel V. Dorris, 
Comment, Fair Labor Standards Act Preemption of State 
Wage-and-Hour Law Claims, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1251, 1275-
81 (2009) (arguing that the lengthy and ongoing history of 
state regulation of wage and hour regulations requires the 
application of the presumption against preemption to the 
FLSA).  For these reasons, we do not believe the state laws at 
issue here are impliedly preempted as an obstacle to 
Congress’s purpose. 
   Rite Aid offers a more refined version of their 
preemption argument when they suggest that, while the FLSA 
does not preempt the state-law substantive provisions at issue, 
the enforcement of the MWHL and the OMFWSA through 
opt-out class actions conflicts with Congress’s intent in 
enacting § 216(b) and should stand preempted.  This 
argument largely recapitulates the concept of inherent 
incompatibility, which we have already rejected.  The 
argument fails here because of a flaw in Rite Aid’s 
reasoning—namely, that the opt-out procedure at issue is 
provided not by state law, but under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d).  Because federal law cannot preempt another federal 
law, and a statute from 1947 cannot impliedly repeal a law 
from 2005, preemption is inapplicable.       
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The cases cited by Rite Aid do not alter this 
conclusion.  In Anderson v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F.3d 181 
(4th Cir. 2007), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
ruled that plaintiffs’ claims under North Carolina’s “contract, 
negligence, and fraud” laws were preempted by the FLSA.  
But Anderson is readily distinguishable because none of the 
state laws at issue created the substantive rights that had been 
allegedly violated.  Instead, the court noted, the plaintiffs 
“rely on the FLSA for their rights, and invoke state law only 
as the source of remedies for the alleged FLSA violations.”  
Anderson, 508 F.3d at 193.  The court sensibly declined to 
allow the plaintiffs to use state non-labor laws to enforce the 
substantive provisions of the FLSA, analogizing their 
decision to an earlier holding that plaintiffs could not enforce 
their FLSA rights through a § 1983 action.  Id. at 193-94 
(citing Kendall, 174 F.3d 437).  By contrast, plaintiffs here do 
not seek to enforce rights conferred under the FLSA through 
state-law remedies; they seek instead to enforce rights granted 
by independent state employment laws through a federal 
remedy.  See Martinez-Hernandez v. Butterball, LLC, 578 F. 
Supp. 2d 816, 819-21 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (holding that 
plaintiffs’ claims under state statutory minimum wage and 
overtime laws are not preempted under the FLSA because 
“unlike Anderson . . . plaintiffs are not merely using state law 
to enforce their rights under the FLSA”).  We cannot 
conclude that plaintiffs are doing an “end run” around the 
requirements of the FLSA simply because state legislatures 
made the policy decision to track federal standards in 
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enacting their own labor laws.19
 In sum, there is no evidence that Congress intended the 
FLSA to preempt the MWHL and the OMFWSA.  We will 
  
                                              
19 Rite Aid also points to Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d 439.  The 
Ellis court reasoned that the state wage and hour laws at issue 
in that case, including the OMFWSA, were not included 
within the scope of the FLSA’s savings clause because they 
did not provide greater protection than the FLSA, and that 
their enforcement through a Rule 23 class action would 
“essentially nullify Congress’s intent in crafting Section 
216(b) and eviscerate the purpose of Section 216(b)’s opt-in 
requirement.”  Id. at 449-52 (quoting Otto v. Pocono Health 
Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524 (M.D. Pa. 2006)). 
 We find Ellis unconvincing on this issue.  The Ellis 
court itself noted that the case did not require it to determine 
whether the FLSA preempted state substantive laws, but 
noted that it found preemption analysis merely “useful in 
assessing the opt-in/opt-out conflict.”  Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d 
at 449.  Since the court ultimately ruled that it was not the 
state laws themselves but their method of enforcement that 
conflicted with congressional policy, the decision, although 
dressed in preemptive clothing, was at root based on the 
concept of inherent incompatibility, which we have already 
examined.  The court also made the mistake, discussed 
earlier, of conflating the state laws’ substantive provisions 
with their remedy through the opt-out procedure outlined in 
Rule 23, which is not subject to preemption.  For these 
reasons, we disagree with the suggestion in Ellis that the 
FLSA preempts state laws that parallel its provisions.  
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affirm the District Court’s judgment that the state laws at 
issue are not preempted. 
C. 
The Rules Enabling Act grants the Supreme Court the 
power to create federal rules of practice and procedure with 
the restriction that these rules “shall not abridge, enlarge, or 
modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).  Rite Aid 
urges affirmance on the alternate ground that certification of a 
Rule 23 class action violates this prohibition because it would 
abridge the “substantive right” not to be sued in a 
representative action. 
The Ellis court endorsed this position in the context of 
inherent incompatibility.  It reasoned that Rule 23 is 
procedural because it merely provides “a mechanism whereby 
rights and duties of classes of plaintiffs and defendants may 
be enforced,” but that the FLSA’s opt-in provision creates 
“two principal substantive rights: the right of employers not 
to be sued in representative actions, and the right of 
employees not to have their rights litigated without their 
knowledge and express consent.”  Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 
456 (footnote omitted).  Certification under Rule 23 of state 
law claims identical to those in the FLSA opt-in action would 
“annihilate[] both of these intended results” because it would 
subject employers to representative actions and subject 
employees to the preclusive effects of a decision made 
without their individual agency or input.  Id. at 456-57.   In 
this context, therefore, Rule 23 would operate to “abridge” a 
substantive right, in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.  Id. 
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Ellis is the minority view.  Every other court to 
examine the issue has concluded that the Rules Enabling Act 
does not bar certification of an opt-out class action based on 
state employment-law claims paralleling the FLSA.  See, e.g., 
Butler v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 662, 675-76 
(D. Md. 2011); Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 708 F. 
Supp. 2d 781, 793 (W.D. Wis. 2010); Cohen v. Gerson 
Lehrman Grp., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 317, 324 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152, 164-
65 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Lehman v. Legg Mason, Inc., 532 F. 
Supp. 2d 726, 732-33 (M.D. Pa. 2007); Neary v. Metro. Prop. 
& Cas. Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d 247, 250-51 (D. Conn. 
2007).  This skepticism is well founded.  Assuming for the 
sake of argument the proposition that § 216(b) confers rights 
to employers “not to be sued in representative actions” and to 
employees “not to have their rights litigated without their 
consent,” those rights would extend only to actions under the 
FLSA and are not abridged or modified by the certification of 
a state-employment law class under Rule 23.  Damassia, 250 
F.R.D. at 164-65.  But even if we construed the provisions as 
in direct conflict, the “rights” conferred under § 216(b) are 
procedural under well-established precedent, since they relate 
to “the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties 
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering 
remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them,” 
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1965), and therefore 
would be properly displaced by Rule 23, Burlington N. R.R. 
Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1987). 
But whatever our view of the merits of the Rules 
Enabling Act argument, Rite Aid’s claim cannot survive the 
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Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., --- U.S. ---, 130 S. 
Ct. 1431 (2010) (plurality).  There, the Court determined that 
the certification of a class action under Rule 23 alleging 
violations of New York law did not violate the Rules 
Enabling Act, even though New York law prohibited the 
petitioner’s suit from proceeding as a class action.  Id. at 
1442-44.  The plurality rejected the respondent’s argument 
that certification abridged the “substantive right . . . not to be 
subject to aggregated class-action liability” conferred under 
New York law and held that the “substantive nature of New 
York’s law, or its substantive purpose, makes no difference.”  
Id. at 1443-44 (omission in original) (emphasis removed).  
“[I]t is not the substantive or procedural nature or purpose of 
the affected state law that matters,” the Court continued, “but 
the substantive or procedural nature of the Federal Rule.”  Id.   
Concurring, Justice Stevens reached the same result by 
determining that the New York state law at issue was “a 
classically procedural calibration” attempting to balance 
competing goals of litigation similar to “filing fees or 
deadlines for briefs.”  Id. at 1459 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment).  He reasoned that there 
is “a difference of degree between those examples and class 
certification, but not a difference of kind; the class vehicle 
may have a greater practical effect on who brings lawsuits 
than do low filing fees, but that does not transform it into a 
damages ‘proscription’ or ‘limitation.’”  Id. (citations 
omitted).  Accordingly, Rule 23, not New York state law, 
properly governed the suit.  Id. at 1459-60. 
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Shady Grove leaves no room for the arguments 
advanced by Rite Aid, which parallel the contentions the 
Court rejected.  Under the plurality’s view, any supposed 
substantive purpose underlying § 216(b) is irrelevant, and we 
need only determine whether Rule 23 “really regulates 
procedure,” which the Court has already concluded it does.  
Under the concurrence’s view, the regulation of class relief 
under § 216(b) is procedural, and class certification does not 
implicate the Rules Enabling Act.  Under either view, Rite 
Aid’s argument fails.  For these reasons, we reject Rite Aid’s 
contention that permitting an opt-out class action alleging 
violations of the MWHL and the OMFWSA to proceed 
alongside a separately-filed FLSA opt-in action would violate 
the Rules Enabling Act. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgments with respect to preemption, reverse with 
respect to inherent incompatibility, and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
